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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3, having been referred to that Court by the Utah Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the District Court err in denying the defense's motion for mistrial despite finding the
prosecutor inappropriately argued to the jury regarding suppression issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion and this standard is met
only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.

For purposes of

determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our overriding concern is that defendant
received a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998).

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
Defendant objected to the improper argument regarding suppression issues during the
prosecutor's closing argument, see Record at 204, p. 181, and moved for a mistrial at the conclusion
of the closing argument, which motion the district court denied, finding that although the
prosecutor's argument was inappropriate, it did not justify declaring a mistrial. See Record at 204,
pp. 183-189.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Appellant was convicted at jury trial of unlawful possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute, a first-degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A
misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 5 to life in prison on the felony, with sentence on the
misdemeanor stayed. See Judgment, R. at 192-195.
Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine and paraphernalia found
in the car driven by the Defendant as well as at the place where he resided, and the Court suppressed
the evidence as having been obtained via an unconstitutional search of the residence based on the
fact there was no warrant and no consent for the search thereof, but did not suppress the evidence
from the car based on the finding that the search was incident to arrest and part of an inventory
search. See Record at 67-72, 95-96, 99-101, 106-107, and 206. At trial, the drug evidence only
from the car was presented, but in his closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury as follows:
Sometimes juries get - they get caught up in, ah, suppression issues and things like
that when they get back to deliberate, I just want to tell you that - that those issues,
ah, have already been resolved in the case. In other words, See Record at 204, p. 180-181. Defense counsel then objected and the Court sustained the objection.
M a t 181.
The Defense moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the closing argument, which motion
the district court denied, finding that although the prosecutor's argument was inappropriate, it did
not justify declaring a mistrial. See Record at 204, pp. 183-189.
The prosecution's evidence at trial was that the Defendant had been seen driving alone in a
vehicle with no license plates, had been pulled over, and that approximately 54 grams of
methamphetamine was found in a speaker hole in the driver's side door panel, along with a small
set of scales and plastic baggies. See Record at 204, pp. 58-62, 66-78, 90-98.
The Defense elicited testimony that while the Defendant owned and was pulled over while
2

driving the vehicle in question, that the vehicle had only been driven by the Defendant for a few
hours, starting the very day he was arrested, and that the Defendant and a friend had just put a new
engine in it, prior to which it had been inoperable and sitting in a parking lot, broken down and
unlocked (it had no door key), and thus that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the contraband
may have been placed or stored in the truck by someone other than the Defendant. Id. at pp. 131138, 146-150. There was no fingerprint evidence linking the contraband to the Defendant. Id. at pp.
98-99. There were no witnesses which stated that the Defendant had ever held, possessed on his
person, sold, or used the methamphetamine found in the speaker hole in the car. Id., passim.
The Defense's argument for mistrial was that it was prosecutorial misconduct for the
prosecutor to tell the jury that there were suppression issues in the case and that they had been
resolved; and that the prosecutor, in mentioning that there were suppression issues in the case, and
that those had been resolved, gives a message to the jury that there is other incriminating evidence
which he wasn't able to present. Id. at p. 183.
The prosecutor countered that the purpose of the statements was simply to explain that issues
regarding how the search of the car was conducted were not part of what the jury was to consider and
decide. Id. at pp. 186-188,
The dislrict court agreed that it was inappropriate for the prosecutor to make these statements.
Id. at p. 189. The district court, in its questioning of defense counsel after the motion was made,
pressed the point that in fact there had been suppression issues in the case and that evidence had in
fact been suppressed, and thus that the prosecutor had not spoken untruthfully. Id. at p. 185.
However, the district court then determined that there was not anything in the statements from
which the jury would have inferred that there was other evidence that they were not told about and
that this was not the purpose of the statements; and thus ruled that they did not rise to the level that
required a mistrial. Id. dtp. 189.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The prosecutor's inappropriate statements, that there were suppression issues in the case that
have already been decided, tainted the trial with the information that there existed other
incriminating evidence which had been suppressed and thus which the jury was not allowed to hear,
thus depriving the Defendant of his right to a fair trial.

ARGUMENTS
Rulings on motions for mistrial are reviewed for abuse of discretion and this standard is met
only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.

For purposes of

determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our overriding concern is that defendant
received a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998)
Utah's appellate courts have made clear that the use of evidence at trial which was subject
to suppression, due to its having been obtained via an unconstitutional search, requires reversal of
conviction unless reviewing court sincerely believes that error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App.1995).
Courts from other states have handled situations with the unique fact pattern of this case in
which it is the prosecutor rather than a witness who makes the impermissible revelation. They have
found, for example, that where a suppression of evidence is ordered by the court due to an improper
search and seizure, neither the items discovered as a result of the search nor testimony or remarks
relating thereto is admissible in evidence. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 431 S.W.2d 462 (Ark. App.
1968). A prosecuting attorneys making remarks relating to suppression of evidence falls within this
rule of law and should be considered clearly prejudicial. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496
(Ark. App. 1974); Robinson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 534, 534-536 (Ark. App. 1981).
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The prosecutor's inappropriate statements, that there were suppression issues in the case that
have already been decided, tainted the trial with the information that there existed other
incriminating evidence which had been suppressed and thus which the jury was not allowed to hear,
thus depriving the Defendant of his right to a fair trial.
The district court's analysis of the impact of the statements was flawed. First, it determined
that there was not anything in the statements from which the jury would have inferred that there was
other evidence that they were not told about. To the contrary, it can objectively and reasonably be
inferred from the prosecutor's statements, that there were suppression issues where had already been
decided, that there was evidence not presented at trial which had been suppressed. It may be true
that the district court did not infer this, and furthermore the district court may have itself felt the
prosecutor's purpose was pure, but it does not follow that jurors could not reasonably make very
prejudicial inferences from the prosecutor's comments, regardless; it is imminently reasonable to
infer from the statement that there were suppression issues in this case, that evidence had been
suppressed; and evidence which is suppressed is evidence which is suppressed from presentation at
trial. It is difficult to understand how these are not reasonable inferences. They are hardly even
inferences at all, but are rather simply obvious meanings taken from the prosecutor's statements.
If they are inference, however, they are certainly reasonable inferences.
Indeed the district court, in his questioning of defense counsel after the motion was made,
presses the point that in fact there had been suppression issues in the case and that evidence had in
fact been suppressed, and thus that the prosecutor had not spoken untruthfully. The district court
then, however, decided that inferring this truth was unreasonable. These are contradictory lines of
reasoning and this contradiction exposes the error of the district court's analysis.
Since the district court's decision not to declare a mistrial was based upon its erroneous
determination that no reasonable inference could be taken from the prosecutor's statement that there
was additional incriminating evidence suppressed and not presented at trial, his decision was an
5

abuse of discretion and warrants reversal.
The Defendant was deprived of a fair trial when the jury was tainted with the prosecutor's
statements which revealed, or at least reasonably implied, that additional incriminating evidence
existed but had been suppressed.
The prosecution's evidence at trial was that the Defendant had been seen driving alone in a
vehicle with no license plates, had been pulled over, and that approximately 54 grams of
methamphetamine was found in a speaker hole in the driver's side door panel, along with a small
set of scales and plastic baggies. The Defense elicited testimony that while the Defendant owned
and was pulled over while driving the vehicle in question, that the vehicle had only been driven by
the Defendant for a few hours, starting the very day he was arrested, and that the Defendant and a
friend had just put a new engine in it, prior to which it had been inoperable and sitting in a parking
lot, broken down and unlocked (it had no door key), and thus that there was reasonable doubt as to
whether the contraband may have been placed or stored in the truck by someone other than the
Defendant.

There was no fingerprint evidence linking the contraband to the Defendant. The

prosecutor's statement, and the revelation accomplished thereby that additional incriminating
evidence existed but had been suppressed, very likely could have tipped the jury against finding
reasonable doubt based upon the Defense's evidence regarding the status of the car, coupled with
the lack of fingerprint evidence in the case and lack of witnesses stating that the Defendant had ever
held, possessed on his person, sold, or used the methamphetamine found in the speaker hole in the
car. This was not a case with overwhelming evidence against the Defendant, in which it can be
reasonably concluded that the jury would have convicted regardless of the prosecutor's statement.
This is an unusual case; there is case law addressing a defendant's right to a new trial when
suppressed evidence is admitted. See, e.g., State v. Movant, 574 A.2d 502 (N.J. Super. 1990) (new
trial warranted based on admission of evidence which had been suppressed). In this case, however,
it was not that the suppressed evidence was admitted in the evidence phase of the trial; instead, it was
6

alluded to by the prosecutor in closing argument. While it will likely be argued by the appellee that
this distinction mitigates in its favor, the opposite is true; when a prosecutor refers to suppressed
evidence in closing, there is no chance for cross-examination, no chance to rebut with contradictory
evidence; rather, it is simply placed into the jury's domain, without opportunity to refute and without
a meaningfull means to "unring the bell." Thus, if the introduction of suppressed evidence warrants
a new trial, then aprosecutor's revelation that suppressed evidence exists warrants a new trial all-themore. Indeed, it is appropriate to hold an even higher standard, against the State, in the scenario in
the instant case, where it is the prosecutor- a lawyer fully cognizant of appropriate legal restrictions
on what can and cannot be presented to the jury - makes the mistake, as opposed to a lay witness
(unschooled in evidentiary restrictions) letting an inappropriate comment slip in response to a
question.
Conviction obtained at trial wherein information regarding evidence which, under
constitutional scrutiny, is appropriately suppressed, should be reversed, unless the reviewing court
sincerely believes that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d
916 (Utah App. 1995). Given the prosecutor's inappropriate comments regarding suppression, and
given the modest evidence presented by the State, the lack of fingerprint or corroborating witness
testimony, and the plausible issues raised by the defense, this is a conviction that should be reversed.
Where a suppression of evidence is ordered by the court due to an improper search and seizure,
neither the items discovered as a result of the search nor testimony or remarks relating thereto should
be introduced into what the pure vessel of the trial jury, and the prosecuting attorney's remarks
relating to suppression of evidence should be considered to fall within this rule and should be
considered clearly prejudicial. See, e.g., Walton v. State, 431 S.W.2d462(Ark. App. 1968); Nelson
v. State, 513 S.W.2d496 (Ark. App. 1974); Robinson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 534, 534-536 (Ark. App.
1981).
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CONCLUSION
A mistrial should have been declared. The conviction should be reversed.
Dated this Jjj?

day of tj [A

20

Q^)

Randall)
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Judgment, Commitment and Sentence

SCOTT F. GARRETT (#8687)
Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite 201
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435)865-5310

MAY 0 3 2005
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY
DEPUTY CLERK
,

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

ROBERT JAMES SHERRY,

)1

Criminal No. 041500345

)

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, having been convicted pursuant to a jury trial
of the offenses of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE, a First-Degree Felony; and POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class
A Misdemeanor; on March 3, 2005, in Parowan, Utah, and the Court having entered the verdicts of
guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report, and after
said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for
sentencing on April 26, 2005, and the Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, having appeared
before the Court in person, together with his attorney of record James K. Slavens, and the State of
Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott F. Garrett, and the Court having

Of f r

reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail, and having further heard
statements from all parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROBERT
JAMES SHERRY, has been convicted of the offenses of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a First-Degree Felony; and
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class A Misdemeanor; and the Court having
asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is
adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROBERT
JAMES SHERRY, and pursuant to his conviction of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a First-Degree Felony, is hereby
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of five (5) years to life, and
the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine shall be imposed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the imposition of sentence on the Defendant's conviction
of POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class A Misdemeanor, shall be stayed.

2-

01 r -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY, shall be
exposed to substance abuse treatment at the Utah State Prison; moreover, any condition of parole
shall include a substance abuse treatment program.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROBERT JAMES SHERRY,
and deliver him to the Utah State Department of Corrections in Draper, Utah, there to be kept
and confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this

^ —

day of May, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

EfHa

}*t
J. PHILIP
Di&rict C o u ^ S ^ T ^ '

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Robert James Sherry.
Criminal No. 041500345, now on file and of record in my office.

OH

WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah.
1st

/

this

day of May, 2005.

CAROLYN BULLOCH
'//•^^,_

y

CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk

-.

/f/'^iK,
-v\

test:
*
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*

*

*

*

•

*

*

'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on
this

Z • day of

ntUAs
Qhk

, 2005, to the following, to wit:

Mr. James K. Slavens
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 752
Fillmore, Utah 84631
]

&A(fU.

Assistant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certified that on the /Jr

day of

A^lf

200 3 I caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing to be served via mailing by US Mail first class postage prepaid to:

Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

